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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

JUDITH H. BELLO*
ALAN F. HOLMER**

U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 19:
The Uruguay Round: Where Are We?
In December 1990 the approximately 100 Contracting Parties of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were scheduled to conclude the gargantuan Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The objective was
nothing less than the revitalization and expansion of the entire international
trading system. For the moment, a successful outcome has eluded trade negotiators. The talks broke down at the trade ministerial meeting in Brussels, principally over the refusal by some nations to reduce their use of export subsidies
and other measures distorting agricultural trade.
The current issues of this article are: (1) what is the status of negotiations in
the Round; and (2) whether, when, and how the talks will conclude.
I. Background
After World War H the Allies sought to establish a multilateral trade organization aimed at liberalizing and stabilizing international trade. While the desired
International Trade Organization did not materialize (due to rejection by the
United States Senate), the GATT was established in Geneva as both a legal
agreement and small organization.
While a laudable first step at achieving its objectives, the GATT has sought to
liberalize trade further through rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. Six
*artner, Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C.; formerly, General Counsel to the U.S. Trade
Representative.
**Partner, Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C.; formerly, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative.
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rounds of such talks succeeded in reducing tariff levels around the globe dramatically from their Great Depression-World War II levels.
The seventh such multilateral trade negotiations were called the Tokyo Round
after their launch at a ministerial meeting in Tokyo in 1975. The Tokyo Round
was the first to seek to eliminate or reduce a host of nontariff barriers to trade.
The fruits of the Tokyo Round at its conclusion in 1979 included not only
traditional tariff reductions, but also various separate codes to which some, but
not all, GATT Contracting Parties subscribed: for example, codes on the use of
subsidies and countervailing measures, antidumping standards, and government
procurement. In the Tokyo Round, the GATT took its first, albeit faltering, step
toward encompassing nontariff barriers to trade under the GATT umbrella.
Following the Tokyo Round, the United States sought to capitalize on its
momentum in order to liberalize international trade further. The next major
GATT initiative was the meeting of trade ministers in Geneva in 1982, which
was intended (at least by the United States) to carry forward the baton of trade
liberalization. This GATT Ministerial, however, was a great disappointment to
the United States. United States Trade Representative William Brock and his
staff returned to Washington discouraged about the prospects of further multilateral liberalization in the short term. Consequently, U.S. trade policy experts
began to explore more earnestly prospects for liberalizing trade through other
avenues (culminating, for example, in free trade agreements with Israel and
Canada, proposed free trade negotiations with Mexico and Canada, and the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which includes the vision of a possible
free trade zone through North and South America).
Nevertheless, the United States never abandoned its commitment to the GATT
as the cornerstone of the international trade system and U.S. trade policy. Indeed, at the same time the United States embarked on free trade negotiations with
its largest trading partner, Canada, it was also instrumental in launching the
eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations, called the Uruguay Round after
its launch in September 1986 at a trade ministerial meeting in Punta del Este,
Uruguay.
II. Status of the Uruguay Round Negotiations
The objectives of the United States in helping to launch the Round were to: (1)
strengthen current but deficient GATT rules, particularly for agriculture and the
settlement of disputes; and (2) expand the GATT's umbrella to cover the new,
"frontier" areas of trade: trade in services, the protection of intellectual property
rights, and investment.
However, not everyone shared the United States' objectives. Many developing
countries opposed in particular any negotiations regarding trade in services.
While the United States succeeded in Punta del Este in including services on the
negotiating agenda, services were to be negotiated more independently of other
subjects.
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The other two "frontier" subjects, in addition to traditional topics (including
agriculture, dispute settlement, safeguards, textiles, tariffs, and "functioning of
the GATT system" (FOGS)) were handled by a negotiating group on goods.
Despite the separation of these two overall groups on services and goods, however,
they both were to report to a single overarching Trade Negotiating Committee.
A.

PRorREss

IN THE ROUND

1. Midterm Review
The GA' Secretariat and trade ministers agreed to hold a Midterm Review of
progress in the negotiations in December 1988 in Montreal. A key objective of
the review was to ensure that ministers became more deeply engaged in the
direction and substance of negotiations, in order to increase the likelihood of
successful resolution of the negotiations within the final two years of the scheduled four-year negotiations. To that extent the Midterm Review succeeded. Issues were crystallized, ministers previously less involved in the negotiations were
more deeply engaged, and a road map was drawn and a timetable of meetings
established for reaching the desired goal of successful conclusion of all negotiations in 1990.
However, perhaps the Ministers' inability to conclude the Midterm Review on
schedule had its own significance. While blueprints were developed in Montreal
for all other negotiating groups, ministers were unable to reach agreement in four
subject areas: agriculture, textiles, intellectual property, and safeguards. The
Ministers resumed discussions on these subjects at a follow-up meeting in
Geneva in April 1989, at which the remaining blueprints were finally accepted.
2. Brussels Ministerial
While all negotiations following the Punta del Este ministerial meeting were
held in Geneva, the concluding session was hosted by the European Communities in Brussels from December 3-7, 1990. However, the Brussels meeting
proved quite disappointing.
By the summer of 1990 significant progress had been made in various negotiating groups. However, in a few groups (notably agriculture, textiles, and
services) earnest negotiations had not truly begun. In agriculture in particular, the
United States and other agricultural exporting countries sought agreement in
principle to undertake reforms in three major areas: export subsidies, internal
supports, and market access. Time after time, however, the European Communities (EC) refused, indicating its intention to agree to an overall level of reform
without necessarily reducing, much less eliminating, export subsidies.
Some major trading partners met in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in April 1990 to
facilitate progress in the Round in general and in agriculture in particular. Some
delegations considered that they had succeeded in the objective of obtaining a
commitment from the EC to make reforms in each of the three key agricultural
areas, not just overall. However, the trumpeted consensus vanished.
FALL 1991
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In July at the Houston Summit, President Bush made the agricultural negotiations in the Round one of his top priorities in discussions with heads of state of
major trading partners. Some delegations understood the EC to agree with President Bush's proposal to undertake reforms in each of the three agricultural
areas. Again the consensus proved illusory.
A trade ministerial meeting in Geneva in August 1990 offered the last likely
opportunity to resolve impasses in negotiations prior to attempting to wind up
negotiations in the fall. Many had hoped that this meeting would provoke a crisis
sufficient to galvanize political leaders to make the painful concessions needed
by all trading partners to conclude the Round successfully. In fact the session
provoked yawns rather than crises and was adjourned early.
As a result, it became clear by November 1990 that trade, finance, and other
ministers would arrive in Brussels the following month with all the tough issues
outstanding, and in some cases with even key issues inadequately crystallized. In
some cases texts that had been developed were riddled with brackets indicating
disagreement on alternative proposals. In other cases there were no legal texts;
negotiators had not made sufficient progress.
Foreshadowed by the shortcomings of the Midterm Review and meetings in
the spring and summer of 1990 at Puerto Vallarta, Houston, and Geneva, the
Brussels ministerial meeting failed to conclude negotiations. While numerous
problems plagued numerous negotiating groups, the center stage impasse was in
agriculture. As in each of the prior meetings, the United States and other exporting nations sought a commitment from the EC to undertake reforms in each
of the areas.
Agriculture negotiations in Brussels, however, proved no more harmonious
than elsewhere. Prospects for a breakthrough seemed all but hopeless when
Swedish Minister Hellstrom offered an eleventh-hour proposal to serve as a basis
for further negotiations. Unfortunately, it was rejected or severely qualified by
the delegations of Japan, Korea, and the EC. Latin and South American negotiators, dismayed at the intransigence of opponents of meaningful agricultural
reform, instructed their representatives in other negotiating groups to withdraw
and cease to participate. While there were many other disagreements in Brussels,
the agricultural impasse proved to be the monkey wrench thrown into the gears.
The operations of the machinery were halted and ministers adjourned sine die.
Finally, in February 1991, the EC agreed in principle to negotiate agricultural
reforms in each of the major areas-export subsidies, internal supports, and
market access. With this at least symbolic progress, negotiations in the Round
have resumed in Geneva, albeit to date generally only at the relatively technical
level.
3. Status in Negotiating Groups
While no agreements were concluded in Brussels, the status of negotiations in
each of the groups is as follows:
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a. Tariffs
At the Midterm Review in December 1988, GATT Contracting Parties agreed
to seek agreement to reduce tariffs overall by at least a third. In the United States,
a private sector coalition called "Zero for Zero" seeks tariff elimination (not just
reduction) in critical trade areas, including pharmaceuticals, wood, paper, construction equipment, beer, electronics, nonferrous metals, fish, and steel. This
coalition's message is that elimination of such tariffs would generate substantial
private sector and congressional support for implementation of agreements
reached in the Round. Many negotiators are using the current hiatus in negotiations to do the technical work necessary to make further requests and offers.
b. Nontariff Measures
Negotiators have concluded ad referendum agreements on rules of origin and
preshipment inspection. The former consists of general principles and commitment to a further work program to flesh out the all-important details; the latter
consists of safeguards against abuses of the preshipment inspection practices
used most often by developing countries. Beyond rules of origin and preshipment
inspection, negotiators seek commitments to eliminate existing nontariff barriers
and to agree not to adopt new ones. Without such agreements, any success in
reducing tariffs would be jeopardized and potentially offset.
c. Natural Resources
This negotiating group is unlikely to reach any separate agreement; it is,
rather, an additional forum in which to discuss issues likely to be addressed in
other groups, such as subsidies.
d. Textiles
The United States retreated from its proposal for a global quota; discussion
now focuses on a transition back to normal GATT rules based on the Multifiber
Arrangement. Despite this breakthrough, all other issues remain unresolved:
duration of the transition, growth rates, product coverage, safeguard measures,
and treatment of fraud.
e. Agriculture
As noted above, EC intransigence to significant agricultural reform, echoed by
Japan and Korea, precipitated the collapse of the Brussels ministerial meeting.
While the Round is plagued with numerous disagreements, no area has proved so
intractable nor such a barrier to progress in other areas as agriculture. If the
agriculture reforms are substantially less than those originally proposed by the
United States, then the United States is likely to insist that its current import
restraints on such items as peanuts, sugar, and dairy products will be protected.
f. Tropical Products
Like natural resources, this group principally provides an additional forum for
discussion of issues addressed elsewhere (such as subsidies and market access).
FALL 1991
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g. GATT Articles
Negotiators have reached some ad referendum agreements on reforming some
GATT articles. However, the key reform sought by developed countriesreducing article XVIII's broad authority for a developing country to restrict trade
to protect its balance-of-payments position-remains in dispute. Developed
countries consider article XVIII a backdoor undermining the certainty of trade
liberalization. Moreover, the developed countries are not likely to make concessions sought by developing countries (such as reintegration of textiles into normal GATT rules) unless the less developed countries agree to strengthened GATT
rules and disciplines, including article XVIII balance of payments actions.
h. Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) Codes
A number of the GATT codes concluded in the Tokyo Round need to be revised.
Some agreements have been tentatively reached regarding valuation, licensing, and
standards. However, increasing calls to put environmental issues under the GAIT
umbrella have not yet resulted in any specific new provisions in the Standards Code.
The leading candidate for code reform is the Antidumping Code. While this
debate will continue when Round negotiations are resumed, it seems unlikely
that the sweeping, fundamental reforms advocated by some exporting nations
and multinational corporations will be adopted. Rather, a balanced package is
more likely to include some reforms advocated by the United States and other
major proponents of strong antidumping laws (such as anticircumvention) and
some reforms advocated by exporting nations and multinationals (such as the
way fair value is calculated, requirements regarding standing, and criteria to
determine injury as a result of imports).
i. Safeguards
The debate unresolved in the Tokyo Round on safeguard negotiations focused
principally on whether safeguard actions should be universal (based on mostfavored-nation (MFN) treatment) or selective (applied to imports from some, but
not all, trading partners). Before the Brussels ministerial meeting concluded, the
EC accepted the MFN standard in principle. However, the EC is expected to seek
to dilute this concession in practice through authorization for quota modulation
(that is, the ability to modulate quotas to affect imports from selected countries
disproportionately).
Proposals have been made to limit the duty of a Contracting Party to compensate adversely affected trading partners when it takes a safeguard action
under article XIX, temporarily restricting imports to protect a domestic industry.
The aim is to encourage parties to take transparent, MFN-based safeguard actions rather than grey-area, selective voluntary-export restraints.
j. Subsidies
The center ring subsidies debate is whether certain types of subsidies should
be classified in the prohibited "red light" category, the permissive "green light"
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category, or the ambivalent (proceed-at-risk-of-domestic-countervailing-dutyproceedings) "yellow light" category. The more contentious types of subsidies
in this regard are those to promote structural adjustment, regional development,
research and development, and protection of the environment. Key representatives of the U.S. manufacturing sector have indicated that more subsidies need to
be subject to a red light for U.S. manufacturing interests to support the Round's
outcome.
k. Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs)
Contracting Parties went into the Brussels ministerial meeting with a heavily
bracketed text, and no new text with significantly fewer brackets emerged. The
macro issues include the competence of the GATT over intellectual property
issues, whether any GATT agreement should prescribe substantive standards,
what transition should be permitted to enable developing countries to come into
conformity with any such standards, and how to treat compulsory licensing. The
micro issues are plentiful, such as the appropriate term of patent protection,
whether such protection should be accorded to the first to file or first to invent,
and the like.
In the United States, the outcome of this negotiating group is pivotal. The
TRIPs agreements appear likely to be the principal achievement of the Round for
developed countries; without a satisfactory TRIPs outcome, developed countries
are not likely to make the concessions sought by developing countries in areas
such as textiles and agriculture.
1. Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
The United States and other developed countries are seeking discipline (and in
some cases, prohibition) of barriers to foreign direct investment. For example,
proposals include prohibitions of local content and export performance requirements. However, some developing countries continue to resist, particularly any
outright prohibitions. These talks are further complicated by opposition from
some foreign investors already operating abroad to free riders, that is those who
want to be foreign investors but who have not paid their dues by meeting local
content, employment, export performance, or other such requirements.
m. Dispute Settlement
Extensive procedural reforms were agreed to ad referendum in the Midterm
Review in December 1988. The major issues still being debated are: (1) whether
and how to make the dispute settlement process more automatic; (2) whether to
provide an opportunity for appeal, at least in extraordinary cases; and (3)
whether to improve surveillance and enforcement of the implementation of dispute settlement outcomes.
n. Functioning of the GATT System (FOGS)
Essentially, the big issue in this negotiating group is whether and how the
GAIT organization should be modified in light of the outcome of the Round and
FALL 1991
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any greater responsibilities it may bear. To date, the major achievement of the
FOGS talks is the trade policy review mechanism, which examines and thus
makes more transparent the trade practices of countries under review.
o. Services
Services, one of the frontier areas not currently subject to any GATT
discipline, has proven quite difficult. It spans an enormous range of different
industries, involves new parts of many national bureaucracies not experienced
in trade negotiations or substantive trade issues, and involves some technical
areas (for example, regulation of telecommunications or transportation services).
One particular complication involves the Framework Agreement that calls for
automatic application of MFN treatment, but nonautomatic availability of market
access and national treatment (which must be negotiated, presumably through
more-or-less traditional exchanges of requests and offers). Governments whose
markets are already open oppose the lack of reciprocity in locking their markets
open (through automatic MFN) without obtaining comparable access to foreign
markets (because market access negotiations have not been concluded and may
not be satisfactory).
Another complication is that only the Framework Agreement, itself riddled
with brackets, has been drafted. With few exceptions, annexes covering particular service industries are nonexistent. Without such texts, businessmen and
legislators have difficulty weighing the results.
p. Government Procurement
While legally separate from the Round, negotiations to modify the Tokyo
Round Government Procurement Code are probably on the same general timetable. While some progress has been made, parties continue to disagree, inter
alia, on whether rules about government procurements should be applied as well
to procurements by private bodies subject to government regulation. (For example, the United States opposes, but the EC supports, such extension.)
q. Steel
At the Round's launch in Punta del Este, Uruguay, and at the Midterm Review
in Montreal, no sixteenth negotiating group on steel existed. However, in the
wake of debate in the United States in 1988 and 1989 on whether (and how) to
extend a network of voluntary restraint agreements, Contracting Parties are now
discussing the possible multilateralization of those bilateral agreements. In exchange for agreements by exporting nations to limit steel subsidies, inter alia,
steel importers might agree not to use quantitative restrictions, either as safeguards or in settlements of antidumping or countervailing duty cases. Exporters
also seek restrictions on the initiation of such antidumping or countervailing duty
cases, but agreement here by the United States is unlikely.
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HI. Whether, When, and How the Talks Will Conclude
The EC is considering internal proposals to reform its Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). Conceivably, such reforms, if effected, could make it easier for
the EC to accept substantial discipline on its export subsidies and other tradedistorting agricultural measures. However, during meetings with U.S. Trade
Representative Carla Hills and Secretary of Agriculture Edward Madigan in
early May 1990, EC Commissioner for Agriculture Ray MacSharry reportedly
was preoccupied with proposals for internal CAP reform. United States Government officials indicated that Commissioner MacSharry did not address the issue
of how such internal reforms could be tapped to revive the moribund agricultural
negotiations in the Round.
In addition to the EC's preoccupation with its internal CAP proposals, through
May 1991 the United States Government is preoccupied with the prospects for
extension of the "fast track" in U.S. law. Under the Constitution, the President
does not require any authorization from Congress to enter into trade negotiations.
His power to conduct foreign affairs provides ample negotiating authority. However, since Uruguay Round agreements will require U.S. implementing legislation, the President needs the support of Congress. Most consider that the only
realistic means of obtaining such congressional support and ensuring the passage
of legislation to implement broad trade agreements is the use of fast-track procedures in which Congress extraordinarily agrees in advance to vote on an
up-or-down, take-it-or-leave-it basis, without unraveling amendments. Further,
the fast track requires Congress to act promptly (within a maximum ninety
legislative days) on any implementing bill submitted by the President.
Current law does not provide an open-ended fast track. To ensure access to the
fast track, by March 1, 1991, the President had either to notify Congress of his
intention to enter into trade agreements or to request extension of the fast track
for two years. In view of the deadlock in Brussels, he could not notify Congress
of the former. Moreover, to facilitate free-trade negotiations with Mexico and
Canada he needed to request a fast-track extension regardless of the status of the
Round. Therefore, he did so on March 1, 1991.
That request is subject to disapproval by either the House or the Senate before
May 31, 1991. Any bill submitted to implement either the Uruguay Round or a freetrade agreement with Mexico and Canada would be ineligible for fast-track procedures in the house of the Congress that passed a fast-track disapproval resolution.
Without question, the Congress will vigorously debate the President's request. In
the Senate, the proposed negotiations with Mexico have received considerable support, but the Round has provoked widespread skepticism. Many in the House, by
contrast, generally support the Round, but fear or oppose the proposed talks with
Mexico (in large part due to the staunch opposition of organized labor).
Until the ninety-day period for disapproval of the President's fast-track extension request expires, earnest negotiations on politically sensitive issues are
FALL 1991
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unlikely to take place. The Administration would be reluctant to make meaningful
concessions for fear of provoking further opposition to the fast-track extension
request. Other governments presumably would be loathe to make concessions at a
time when they are unlikely to obtain reciprocal rights and benefits. The Brussels
stalemate, therefore, is likely to continue until at least the summer of 1991.
In the interim it is possible that substantial progress can be achieved in less
controversial areas; in underdeveloped areas (notably the services negotiations),
muscle and flesh could be added to any skeletons (or skeletons created where
they too are absent). Nevertheless, without visible progress on the controversial
issues, GATT Contracting Parties are likely to be distracted by other developments and momentum will surely be lost. Key nations must make major efforts
in the summer of 1991 to recoup the momentum.
IV. Possible Outcomes
For the negotiations to succeed, an overall balance of reciprocal rights and
obligations must be achieved. Nations must consider themselves net winners
rather than losers, or they will either refuse to accede to the agreements or
(worse) do so but not comply with their terms.
Most important to the developing world, presumably, is access to markets in
developed countries, in particular in textiles and agricultural goods. The Round
cannot succeed without fundamental reform in these areas. In the eyes of the
developed world on the other hand, the Round cannot possibly succeed without
a wholly satisfactory agreement on the protection of intellectual property. To
encourage innovation, facilitate progress, and expedite improvement in standards of living around the globe, intellectual property needs to be protected from
current widespread piracy. Without the limited periods of market exclusivity
afforded by patents, copyrights, trademarks, and so on, to encourage innovation,
the wheels of progress would turn far too slowly.
To a lesser extent, most developed countries also need satisfactory agreements
on market access, trade in services, and investment. Market access is perhaps
especially important because it would provide political support for the manufacturing sector, which in the United States at least does not appear to consider
success in the frontier areas alone satisfactory.
V. Conclusion
Success in the Uruguay Round is not assured; to the contrary, the negotiations
are imperiled. However, they are not dead and can be resuscitated if, inter alia,
the U.S. fast track is extended beyond 1991 and the EC forges the political will
to undertake satisfactory reforms in agriculture. These two developments would
likely break the logjam preventing further progress in the Round and enable the
GATT Contracting Parties to enjoy a real opportunity to conclude this mammoth,
marathon endeavor successfully within the next year or two.
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